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Developing a Bidding Agent for Multiple
Heterogeneous Auctions
PATRICIA ANTHONY and NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS
University of Southampton
Due to the proliferation of online auctions, there is an increasing need to monitor and bid in
multiple auctions in order to procure the best deal for the desired good. To this end, this paper
reports on the development of a heuristic decision making framework that an autonomous agent
can exploit to tackle the problem of bidding across multiple auctions with varying start and end
times and with varying protocols (including English, Dutch and Vickrey). The framework is ﬂex-
ible, conﬁgurable, and enables the agent to adopt varying tactics and strategies that attempt to
ensure that the desired item is delivered in a manner consistent with the user’s preferences. Given
this large space of possibilities, we employ a genetic algorithm to search (ofﬂine) for effective strate-
gies in common classes of environment. The strategies that emerge from this evolution are then
codiﬁed into the agent’s reasoning behaviour so that it can select the most appropriate strategy
to employ in its prevailing circumstances. The proposed framework has been implemented in a
simulated marketplace environment and its effectiveness has been empirically demonstrated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence—intelligent agents; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce—distributed
commercial transactions
General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Experimentation
Additional Key Words and Phrases: multiple auctions, bidding strategy, genetic algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
Online auctions are a popular and effective medium for procuring goods and
services in both business to business and business to consumer electronic com-
merce [Bapna et al. 2001; He et al. 2003]. To date, there are more than 2500
auction houses that conduct business online.1 Some of the well-known auction
1http://www.InternetAuctionList.com.
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houses include eBay,2 Amazon.com,3 Yahoo!Auction,4 Priceline,5 UBid6 and
many others. These auction houses conduct many different types of auctions,
but the more popular ones are English, Dutch, ﬁrst-price sealed bid and second-
price sealed bid (also known as Vickrey). In an English auction, the auctioneer
begins with the lowest acceptable price and bidders are free to raise their bids
successively until there are no more offers to raise the bid or until the end
of the auction is reached if there is a time limit. The winning bidder is the
one with the highest bid [McAfee and McMillan 1987]. A Dutch auction is the
opposite of an English one in that the auctioneer starts with an initial high
price, which is then lowered progressively until there is an offer from a bidder
to claim the item. In the ﬁrst-price sealed bid, each bidder submits their of-
fer for the item without any knowledge of the others bids. The highest bidder
gets the item and they pay a price equal to their bid. The Vickrey auction is
similar to the ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction, where the item is awarded to the
highest bidder but they pay a price equal to the second highest bid [Vickrey
1961].
As the number of auction houses increases, consumers are faced with the
problem of monitoring many auction sites, picking which auction to participate
in, and making the right bid to ensure that they get the desired item under con-
ditions that are consistent with their preferences. These processes of monitor-
ing, selecting and making bids are both complex and time consuming. The task
becomes even more complicated when there are different start and end times
and when the auctions employ different protocols. For this reason, some online
auctions provide bidding agents (proxy bidders) to assist consumers with these
tasks.7 In these systems, the consumer needs to supply their bidding agent with
details of the item that they wish to purchase, as well as the maximum amount
that they are willing to pay for it. The bidding agent then proceeds to bid in the
auction and updates the consumer about the status of the auction from time to
time until it terminates. While freeing the consumer to a certain extent, this
type of facility typically has the problem of only being able to operate at a single
auction site, or only operating with a single auction protocol. If the consumer
wishes to participate in another auction, they need to wait until the auction
is concluded to avoid getting multiple items. In addition, the auction site host
could use information about the consumer to cheat them by manipulating the
auction. This is possible in English auctions through shill bidding where bids
are deliberately placed to drive up the price of an item [McAfee and McMillan
1992]. In this case, the consumer can be made to pay a price equal (or very
close) to their maximum bid.
In view of these complexities, consumers tend to focus on a single auction of
their choice. Unfortunately, winning in that auction does not necessarily mean
2http://www.ebay.com.
3http://www.amazon.com.
4http://auctions.shopping.yahoo.com.
5http://www.priceline.com.
6http://www.ubid.com.
7http://www.ebay.com.
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that they get the best deal. They may have received a better price in another
auction. The losers may also have had better luck in another auction as well.
From the seller’s perspective, the lock in of bidders is also a disadvantage since
those agents that value the good highly may not be amongst this set. This, in
turn, restricts the expected revenue from the auction.
As a step toward the multiple auctions case, consumers can utilize the
services of auction search engines (such as BidXS,8 AuctionWatch,9 and
AuctionBeagle10). These allow the consumer to monitor multiple concurrent
auctions, but they leave the actual bidding decision to the consumer. While
this certainly increases the consumer’s knowledge of the global marketplace,
it does not solve the problem of reducing the amount of time that has to be
spent online. Moreover, deciding what amount to bid for an item requires an
intelligent decision where the consumer needs to come up with a strategy to
work out the bid value. In many cases, the outcome of this decision making is
that the consumer is trapped with the winner’s curse phenomenon where they
pay more than the actual value of the item [Klemperer 1999].
To address these shortcomings, we believe it is necessary to develop an
autonomous agent that can participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions,
that is empowered with trading capabilities and that can make purchases au-
tonomously. In more detail, the agent should monitor and collect information
from the ongoing auctions, make decisions on behalf of the consumer and en-
deavour to guarantee the delivery of the item. The agent must ensure that
it never bids above the private valuation (the maximum amount that the con-
sumeriswillingtopay)andittriestogettheiteminamannerthatisconsistent
with the consumer’s preferences (e.g., at the earliest time, at the lowest price,
or with maximum chance of succeeding).
To this end, this article reports on our work in developing such a bidding
agent. The agent has a range of strategies that it can employ depending on the
user’s aims and the environment in which the agent ﬁnds itself. Here we con-
sider three different types of protocol: English, Dutch and Vickrey.11 The strate-
gies themselves are heuristic in nature because the multiple heterogeneous
auction environment is very complex, dynamic and unpredictable, making it
impossible to ﬁnd an optimal strategy that can be used in practical contexts
[Byde et al. 2002]. Moreover, our early investigations showed that the effective-
ness of the strategies was heavily inﬂuenced by the nature of the environment
[Anthony et al. 2001]. For this reason we decided to have different strategies
for different circumstances. As the range of potential strategies is huge, we de-
cided to use a genetic algorithm (GA) to search for effective strategies for each
of the various environments that we identiﬁed [Anthony and Jennings 2002].
We chose this particular method because GAs have been known to perform
well in areas where the space to be searched is large and not well understood
8http://www.bidxs.com.
9http://www.auctionwatch.com.
10http://www.auctionbeagle.com.
11The ﬁrst-price sealed bid is not considered here because of its similarities (from a strategic point
of view) to the Dutch auction [McAfee and McMillan 1987].
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[Mitchell 1996]. Having evolved the strategies, the agent adopts the one that
is most appropriate to its prevailing context.
This paper advances the state of the art in the following ways. First, we
develop a high level decision-making framework for an agent to bid across mul-
tiple concurrent auctions of varying protocols with varying start and end times.
This framework is heuristic in nature and uses tactics and strategies to vary
the agent’s behavior so as to ensure a good ﬁt with the user’s auction objectives.
Second, we evolve a strategy that is effective in our multiple auction context.
This strategy consists of multiple evolved sub-behaviors that are appropriate in
different environmental settings and with different user objectives. This strat-
egy is termed the intelligent bidding strategy in the remainder of this article.
Third, we systematically evaluate the intelligent bidding strategy to highlight
its operational characteristics in different scenarios.
The remainder of the article is structured in the following manner: In the
next section, we describe our electronic marketplace scenario in which our al-
gorithms are evaluated. Section 3 describes the fundamentals of the bidding
algorithm and our initial evaluation of the various environmental factors that
effect its performance. Section 4 describes the work on evolving strategies for
particular classes of environments and the evaluation of the effectiveness of
this method of approach. Section 5 describes and evaluates the intelligent bid-
ding strategy. Section 6 discusses related work and ﬁnally, Section 7 presents
our conclusions and further work.
2. THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE
The simulated electronic marketplace consists of a number of auctions that run
concurrently (see Figure 1).12 There are three types of auctions running in the
environment: English, Dutch and Vickrey. The English and Vickrey auctions
have a ﬁnite start time and duration generated randomly from a uniform prob-
ability distribution, the Dutch auction has a start time but no predetermined
end time. The start and end times vary from one auction to another. At the
start of each auction (irrespective of the type), a group of random bidders are
generated to simulate other auction participants. These participants operate
in a single auction and have the intention of buying the target item and pos-
sessing certain behavior. They maintain information about the item they wish
to purchase, their private valuation of the item (the maximum amount that
they are willing to pay for the desired item), the starting bid value and their
bid increment. These values are generated randomly from a standard proba-
bility distribution. Their bidding behavior is determined based on the type of
auction that they are participating in. In an English auction, they initiate bid-
ding at their starting bid value; when making a counter offer, they add their
12The marketplace is a virtual simulation in that it is supposed to represent all the auctions that
are selling the desired item anywhere on the Internet. It is obviously a simpliﬁcation, since by
grouping them in this way we can focus on the agent’s bidding strategy (our main aim) and we
do not have to worry about the (very important and difﬁcult) problems of ﬁnding all the auctions
that sell the desired item, semantic interoperability due to heterogeneous information models and
ontologies, latency due to network trafﬁc variability, or interfacing our software to proprietary
commercial auction houses.
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Fig. 1. The Marketplace simulator.
bid increment to the current offer (provided the total is less than their private
valuation), and they stop bidding when they acquire the item or when their
private valuation is reached. In a Dutch auction, they wait until the offer value
is equal to or less than their private valuation before making an offer. Finally,
in a Vickrey auction, they bid at their private valuation. These strategies are
all based on the dominant strategies of the respective one-shot single auctions
[Sandholm 1999].
The auction starts with a predeﬁned starting value; a small value for an
English auction and a high value for a Dutch one. There are obviously no start
values for the Vickrey auctions. Offers and counter offers are accepted from
bidders that are picked randomly from the pool of bidders in that particular
auction. These processes are repeated until either the private valuation or the
end time for that auction is reached. The winner in an English auction is the
bidder with the highest bid value at the end of the auction. An item will remain
unsold if the highest price offered is less than the item’s reservation price. In a
Dutch auction, when no offer is received from the bidders, the value is reduced
(based on a ﬁxed decrement value) and the whole process is repeated. The item
is sold when a bidder agrees to buy the item at the current offer price. If there is
morethanonebidderwhoisinterestedatthesameprice,theitemwillbesoldto
the bidder who offered to buy the item ﬁrst. There may be cases where there is
no offer from any bidders throughout a particular auction. In this situation, the
auction terminates when the decremented offer reaches the reservation price
for the item. Bidders in a Vickrey auction submit their bid values before the
end of the auction. Bids are opened at the end of the auction and the winner is
the one who offered the highest price, but the amount paid for the item is the
value of the second highest bid. If there is a tie, the winner is the bidder who
submits the earliest bid. As in the English auction, an item will not be sold if
the offer price is less than its reservation price.
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The marketplace is ﬂexible and can be conﬁgured to run any number of
auctionsandoperateforanylengthofdiscretetime.Weassumethatallauctions
in the marketplace are auctioning the item that the consumers are interested
in. Our bidder agent is allowed to bid in any of the auctions and it aims to
deliver the item to its consumer based on their preferences. The bidder agent
is given a hard deadline by when it needs to obtain the item. The bidder agent
utilizes the available information to make its bidding decision; this includes
the consumer’s private valuation, the time it has left to acquire the item, the
currentofferofeachindividualauction,anditssetsoftacticsandstrategies.The
private valuation is derived from the item’s closing price distribution, observed
from past auctions. The tactics and strategies are the main constituents that
drive the agent’s behavior in making the bidding decision (these are described
in Section 3). The output of the bidding decision is the auction the agent should
bid in and the recommended bid value that it should bid in that auction. If the
agent does not purchase the item by its deadline, it returns to the consumer for
further instructions.
3. DESIGNING THE AGENT’S BIDDING STRATEGY
Toensurethatourbidderagentoperateseffectivelyinthemarketplace,itneeds
to possess a strategy to ensure that it obtains the item within the given time ac-
cording to the consumer’s preferences. Here the bidding strategy for the agent
is modelled on the idea of negotiation decision functions as proposed by Faratin
et al. [1998]. The original model deﬁned a range of strategies that an agent can
employ to generate initial offers and counter offers in a two party negotiation.
This model identiﬁes the key constituents that drive an agent’s negotiation be-
havior and deﬁned a single tactic to deal with each of them. The agent’s overall
behavior is then the amalgamation of these different facets, weighted by their
relative importance to the user. Mapping this to an auction environment, the
bidder agent needs to decide the new bid value based on the current offer price.
Thecurrentoffercanbetreatedastheofferandthenewbidvaluecanbetreated
as the counter offer. Negotiation is over when the auction terminates or when
the bidder’s private valuation is reached (bidder walks out of the negotiation
process).
First, we will present our notation. Let t be the current universal time across
all auctions, where t 2 0, and 0 is a set of ﬁnite time intervals. Let tmax be the
time by when the agent must obtain the good (i.e. 0·t ·tmax), and let A be the
list of all the auctions that will be active before tmax. At any time t, there is a
set of active auctions L(t) where L(t) ½ A. Let E(t), D(t), and V(t) be the set of
active English, Dutch and Vickrey auctions, respectively, where E(t)\D(t)DÁ,
D(t)\V(t)DÁ, E(t)\V(t)DÁ, and E(t)[D(t)[V(t)D L(t). Each auction i 2 A,
will have its own start time, ¾i, and its own end time ´i where i 2 E(t) [ V(t).
Let ¸ be the agent’s bid increment value, and pr be its private valuation for the
target item. Let Item NA be a Boolean ﬂag to indicate whether the target item
has already been purchased by the agent. We assume that the value of pr is
based on current reliable market prices observed from past auctions, and that
the marketplace is offering the item that the agent is interested in.
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Fig. 2. Top-level algorithm for the bidding agent.
With these deﬁnitions in place, the algorithm for the bidding agent is sum-
marized in Figure 2. Since each auction has a different start and end time, the
bidder agent needs to build an active auction list to keep track of all the auc-
tions that are currently active in the marketplace. We deﬁne an active auction
as one that has started but not yet reached its end time. The agent identiﬁes
all the active auctions and gathers relevant information about them. It then
calculates the maximum bid it is willing to make at the current time using the
agent’s strategy (described in Section 3.1). This current maximum bid, by deﬁ-
nition, will always be less than or equal to its private valuation. Based on the
value of the current maximum bid, the agent selects the potential auctions in
which it can bid and calculates what it should bid at this time in each such
auction (described in Section 3.2). The auction and corresponding bid with the
highest expected utility is selected from the potential auctions as the target
auction. Finally, the agent bids in the target auction.
3.1 Calculating the Current Maximum Bid
At any given time t, the agent needs to determine its current maximum bid.
This bid is deﬁned as the maximum value that the agent is willing to offer at the
current moment in time. There are several factors that the agent needs to take
into consideration when calculating this value. One is the remaining time that
it has left to acquire the item. Thus, a key determinant of what price to offer
depends on how much time it has left to bid. For example, the agent may decide
to make a low bid value when it has a lot of time left, and as the remaining time
decreases, the agent bids closer to its private valuation. Another consideration
is the number of remaining auctions that the agent can bid in. Here the agent’s
behavior is similar to the time constraint, whereby it may choose to maximize
itschancesofsuccessbybiddingclosetotheprivatevaluationwhenthenumber
of auctions is small. The level of desperateness to obtain the item is another
consideration that the agent may need to take into account. If the agent is
desperate to get the item, it bids aggressively as soon as it starts to ensure that
it maximizes its chance of getting the item. The opposite of this behavior is
that of an agent that is looking for a bargain. If an agent wishes to get the item
at a bargain price, it starts bidding at a very low price and eventually bids its
private valuation when it has very little time left. The set of considerations of
the remaining time left, the remaining auctions left, the desire to get a bargain
and the level of desperateness are here referred to as the bidding constraints.
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The agent uses some combination of these constraints in order to determine its
maximum bid value at the current moment in time. Our model is open in that
if there was another aspect that the consumer wanted the agent to consider,
then this could easily be added in as a new bidding constraint. Exactly which
constraints are used in a given situation is determined by the consumers and
their preferences. Thus, a consumer who wants to ensure it receives the item as
quickly as possible would place the greatest weight on the time until deadline
and the desperateness tactics, whereas a consumer who is looking to minimise
the price paid would value the bargain tactic most highly.
More formally, let C be the set of considerations that the agent takes into
account when formulating a bid and j represent the individual bidding con-
straints, where j 2 1, :::,jCj. Let 1t denote the remaining time left for the
agent to bid (i.e., tmax¡t) and 1a denote the number of auctions left in the mar-
ketplace. Let ¹ denote the agent’s desire for a bargain, where ¹ 2 [0, 1] (where
1 is actively looking for a bargain and 0 is not actively looking for a bargain),
and " denotes the agent’s level of desperateness for the item where " 2 [0, 1]
(where 1 is very desperate and 0 is not desperate). For each of constraint j 2 C,
there is a corresponding function f j(t) which suggests the value to bid based on
that constraint. These individual constraints are then combined using a func-
tion F to produce the agent’s overall position. Examples for F include weighted
average, max or min.
At a given time, the agent may consider any of the bidding constraints in-
dividually or it may combine them depending on the situation (what the agent
sees as being important at that point in time). In this work, if the agent com-
bines multiple bidding constraints, it allocates weights to denote their relative
importance. Thus, let wj(t) be the weight on constraint j at time t, where
8j 2 C,0·w j( t )·1, and
P
j2C wj(t)D1.
The current maximum bid value for the agent at time t, is then calculated as
M(t)D
P
j2C wj(t) f j(t). The agent uses a set of polynomial functions (drawn
from Faratin et al.’s [1998] negotiation functions) to calculate the bid value
based on a single bidding constraint. Here this set of functions is referred to
as the tactics. In the current implementation, the four tactics are remaining
time, remaining auctions, desire for bargain and desperateness. The deﬁnition
of each of these is given below.
3.1.1 The Remaining Time Tactic. This tactic determines the recom-
mended bid value based on the amount of time remaining for the agent.
Assume that the agent is bidding at time 0·t ·tmax. The agent bids closer to
pr as t approaches tmax, and it eventually bids at pr when t Dtmax. To calculate
the bid value at time t, the following expression is used:
frt D®rt(t) pr
where ®rt(t) is a polynomial function of the form:
®rt(t) D krt C (1 ¡ krt)
µ
t
tmax
¶ 1
¯
(1)
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Fig. 3. Bid value for remaining time tactic with tmax D20 and pr D75.
krt is a constant that when multiplied by the size of the interval determines the
value of the starting bid of the agent in any auction. By varying the value ®rt(t),
a wide range of time-dependent functions can be deﬁned from those that start
bidding near pr quickly, to those that only bid near pr right at the end, to all
possibilities in between. The only conditions are that 0·®rt(t)·1, ®rt(0)Dkrt,
®rt(tmax)D1, and 0·krt ·1.
Using the polynomial function deﬁned in Eq. (1), different shapes of curve
can be obtained by varying the values of ¯. This represents an inﬁnite number
of possible tactics, one for each value of ¯. In this tactic, ¯ is drawn from <C,
where 0:005·¯ ·1000. When ¯<1, the tactic maintains a low bid value until
the deadline is almost reached, where this tactic concedes by suggesting the
private valuation as the recommended bid value. The other extreme is when
¯>1;thetacticstartswithabidvalueclosetotheprivatevaluationandquickly
reaches the reservation value long before the deadline is reached. By way of
illustration, Figure 3 shows the different convexity degrees of the curves with
krt D0:30 and ¯ taking on the values 0:1, 1:0 and 4:0, respectively.
3.1.2 The Remaining Auctions Tactic. This tactic is broadly similar to the
remaining time tactic; the agent bids closer to pr as the number of remaining
auctions approaches 0 (since it is running out of opportunities to purchase the
desired item). Thus, fra has the same form as frt and ®ra is deﬁned as follows:
®ra Dkra C (1 ¡ kra)
µ
c(t)
jAj
¶ 1
¯
Most of these terms are similar to ®rt, the only difference being that c(t)i st h e
list of auctions that have been completed between time 0 and time t. ¯ is again
drawn from <C, where 0:005·¯ ·1000.
3.1.3 TheDesireforBargainTactic. Thistacticisemployedwhentheagent
is motivated to try and obtain a bargain. The agent keeps the ¸to a minimum as
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it progresses from t D0t ot max, but eventually bids its private valuation when
tmax is reached. To determine the bid value for this tactic, the agent considers
the minimum bid value for the target item across all the auctions in the mar-
ketplace. At a given time t, newly started English auctions have low current bid
valuesandDutchauctionshaveveryhighcurrentbidvalues.Ontheotherhand,
when auctions are terminating, English auctions typically have high current
bid values and Dutch auctions have low current bid values. Vickrey auctions
do not have any information on the bid values since bids are sealed and they
are only opened at the end time. To deal with these points, the minimum bid
value is calculated by taking into consideration the current bid value and the
proportion of time left in the auction. These values are summed and averaged
with respect to the number of active auctions at that time.
Let vi(t) be the current highest bid value in an auction i at time t, where
i 2 L(t), and !(t) be the minimum bid value for the agent at time t where:
!(t)D
1
jL(t)j
0
@
X
1·i ·jL(t)j
t¡¾ i
´ i¡¾ i
v i(t)
1
A:
The bid value is then calculated using the expression:
fba D!(t) C ®ba(t)(pr ¡ !(t))
where ®ba(t) is deﬁned as:
®ba(t)Dkba C (1 ¡ kba)
µ
t
tmax
¶ 1
¯
: (2)
Assume that ®ba(t) is similar to the polynomial function discussed in the ﬁrst
two tactics, but this time, 0:1·kba ·0:3, the minimum value of ¯ equals 0.005
and the maximum value of ¯ equals 0.5. These values reﬂect the fact that an
agent that is looking for a bargain should never bid with ¯>1 because this
would inﬂate the agent’s bid well before the deadline. In contrast, an agent
that is looking for a bargain (with ¯<1) maintains a low bid value until the
deadline is almost reached where it will then suggest pr as the recommended
bid value. By conceding with a recommended bid value of pr, the agent tries to
ensure that it still successfully acquires the item even if it did not succeed in
getting a bargain.
3.1.4 The Desperateness Tactic. This tactic is employed when the agent is
desperate to get the item. The agent bids close to pr at t D0, and eventually
bids at pr when tmax is reached. In this tactic, the agent utilizes the minimum
bid value and the polynomial function of Eq. (2) but with a slight variation to
the value of ¯, where 1:67·¯ ·1000 and 0:7·kde ·0:9. The values picked for
kde are high since a desperate agent starts bidding at a value that is near pr.
With these minor variations, fde is the same as fba and ®de is the same as ®ba.
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3.2 Selecting Potential Auctions and the Target Auction
The agent selects potential auctions if and only if it is not holding the highest
bid in an English auction or it has not placed a bid in a Dutch or a Vickrey
auction. This is to ensure that the agent does not acquire more than one tar-
get item. The agent selects the potential auctions by considering values for
the current maximum bid for each active auction. In the English auctions, this
is carried out by taking those auctions that are close to their end time, in which
the current bid value when added to the bid increment is less than or equal
to the current maximum bid. The agent’s new bid value is the current bid plus
the bid increment. Only English auctions that are close to their end time are
picked to maximise the agent’s chances of winning. If the agent currently holds
a bid in an English auction that still has a long time to complete, it will not be
able to participate in other auctions until it loses out to another bidder or until
the auction terminates. There are several potential outcomes when an auction
terminates; the agent loses out to another bidder; the agent’s bid value may
be less than the private valuation (in which case there will be no winner); or
the agent wins. If either of the ﬁrst two situations occur, the agent loses out in
that it wasted a lot of the time in one auction thus reducing its chances of par-
ticipating in other auctions. The potential Dutch auctions in which the agent
may bid are those with current bids that are less than the current maximum
bid. Here, the agent’s new offer is the current bid for that particular Dutch
auction. The potential Vickrey auctions in which the agent may bid are those
that are terminating at the current time and the agent’s bid value is its current
maximum bid value. The reason for this is because the timing of the bid does
not affect the outcome of the auction, and so it is better to wait until the last
minute [Byde et al. 2002] before placing a bid in a given Vickrey auction.
If there is only one auction in the potential auction list, that one is picked as
the target auction. If there are multiple auctions, the agent calculates the ex-
pected utility for each of them. By deﬁnition, the expected utility is the product
oftheprobabilityoftheagentwinninginthatauctionatthegivenbidvalueand
the value of the agent’s utility function. The auction with the highest expected
utility for the agent’s bid value is picked as the target auction. To calculate the
agent’s probability of winning in an auction, we take into account the closing
price distribution for all the auctions observed over time. In more detail, let
Pw
i (v) be the agent’s probability of winning in auction i if it bids with the value
v. Let Pc
i (p) be the probability of auction i closing at price p. The probability of
winning in an English or Vickrey auction is then:
Pw
i (v)D
X
p>v
Pc
i (p) C
Pc
i (v)
2
where
X
p<v
Pc
i (p)· Pw
i (v)·
X
p·v
Pc
i (p):
We assume that there is a possibility that more than one bidder may bid in an
auction i at value v. The probability of winning in a Dutch auction is slightly
different from the probability of winning in English and Vickrey auctions, due
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to the nature of the auction. In this situation, when the bid value is at pr,i ti s
almost certain that if our agent bids at that value it will win the auction unless
there are collisions (when there is more than one bidder bidding for that item
at a particular price). Let ni be the number of bidders offering to buy the item
at the current offer price in Dutch auction i, and let x be the number of Dutch
auctions. The average number of collisions, µ, is then calculated as
µ D
P
ni
x
:
Hence, the probability of winning in a Dutch auction is deﬁned as Pw
i (v)D 1
µ.
The expected utility for an auction i with a bid value v is then calculated as:
ui(v)D Pw
i (v)Ui(v),
where
Ui(v)D1 ¡
µ
v
pr
¶ 1
¯
:
The ¯ used here is the same as the one used in generating the polynomials
for the tactics. The utility function for each potential auction is calculated by
dividing the payoff amount with pr. The utility value is higher when the payoff
(pr ¡ v) is high (value greater that 0), and it is lower when the payoff is low
(value close to or equal to 0).
3.3 Evaluating the Bidding Strategy
To evaluate the performance of our agent using the bidding algorithm described
above, we undertook an empirical evaluation. We ran the experiments in an
environment where tmax D20. The total number of auctions running is between
20 and 30 and each auction has between 2 and 10 participants. The participants
of the English and Vickrey auctions use the optimal (dominant) strategies to
their respective one-shot auctions. For Dutch auctions, the participants wait
until the offer value is just less than their pr before making an offer. In all
cases, the pr of these agents is drawn from the same probability distribution
as that of our bidding agent. Three control models are deﬁned as a basis for
comparisons. The ﬁrst model (C1) simulates the behavior of a typical simple
bidding agent that randomly joins one auction and stays there until its pr has
been reached or until the auction is over. In the second model (C2), the agent
pickstheauctionthathastheclosestendtimewherethecurrentbidislessthan
its pr, and stays there until the auction is over or until its pr is reached. The
third model (C3) is similar to C2 but the target auction is selected randomly.
In both C2 and C3, if the item is not acquired, the process is repeated until the
allocated time is over.
Experiments were conducted separately for different values of the user’s pri-
vate valuation. Eight different experiments were conducted where each control
model and bidding agent used pr values of 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 80 and 82.
The bidding strategies for the three bidding agents were chosen based on our
intuition depending on the value of the private valuation. Table I shows the
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Table I. Strategies for Bidding Agents
Pr Agent (krt, ¯rt) (kra, ¯ra) (kba, ¯ba) (kde, ¯de) (wrt, wra, wba, wde)
68
I (0.6, 500) (0.6, 500) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 500) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
II (0.8, 900) (0.8, 900) (0.8, 900) (0.4, 0.2, 0.0, 0.4)
III (0.9, 950) (0.9, 950) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
70
I (0.6, 100) (0.6, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 200) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
II (0.7, 500) (0.8, 700) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
II (0.8, 900) (0.9, 900) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
72
I (0.6, 500) (0.7, 500) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
II (0.6, 100) (0.6, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 200) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
III (0.6, 100) (0.6, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 200) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
74
I (0.6, 150) (0.6, 150) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 150) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
II (0.6, 200) (0.7, 200) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
III (0.4, 500) (0.4, 500) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
75
I (0.5, 100) (0.5, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.5, 100) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
II (0.6, 100) (0.6, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 200) (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3)
III (0.6, 300) (0.7, 300) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
77
I (0.6, 100) (0.6, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.7, 200) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
II (0.5, 100) (0.6, 50) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
III (0.5, 50) (0.5, 50) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
80
I (0.3, 50) (0.3, 50) (0.2, 0.5) (0.3, 50) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
II (0.2, 100) (0.2, 100) (0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
III (0.2, 100) (0.3, 0.5) (0.2, 100) (0.4, 0.0, 0.2, 0.4)
82
I (0.1, 20) (1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0)
II (0.1, 20) (0.3, 0.5) (0.3, 0.0, 0.7, 0.0)
III (0.1, 20) (0.1, 20) (0.2, 0.5) (0.1, 20) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
different strategies that were employed by the bidding agents for each private
valuation value.
As an example, Agent I with pr D68, values remaining time as the most im-
portant aspect (wrt D0:4), followed by the desperateness behavior (wde D0:3),
remaining auctions left (wra D0:2) and bargain (wba D0:1). It has a high start-
ing bid value and quickly reaches pr for the remaining time tactic and the re-
maining auctions left tactic. Its desire for a bargain is low (kba D0:3, ¯ba D0:5)
but its level of desperateness is very high (kde D0:7, ¯de D500). Agent II with
pr D68 considers the remaining time left tactic and desperateness tactic as
equally important (wrt D0:4, wde D0:4). It considers the remaining auctions
left tactic as less important (wra D0:2) and is not looking for a bargain at
all (wba D0:0). It starts with a high bid value (krt D0:8, ¯rt D900, kra D0:8,
¯ra D900, kde D0:8, and ¯de D900) and quickly reaches pr for all the three tac-
tics considered (this is why the column for the bargain tactic is left blank).
The last agent for pr D68 (Agent III), considers the remaining time left tac-
tic and desperateness tactic as very important (wrt D0:5, wde D0:5), and it is
not interested in the remaining auctions left tactic or the bargain tactic. For
both tactics (krt D0:9, ¯rt D950, kde D0:9, and ¯de D950), the agent starts with
a high bid value and quickly reaches pr. These strategies are chosen because
the prior probability of the agent winning in an auction is very small (0.06). As
the probability of winning in an auction increases (by increasing its private val-
uation), the behavior of each tactic is changed accordingly as can be seen from
Table I.
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Fig. 4. Success rate comparisons.
For each pr, the three bidding agents with varying strategies and the three
control models were run for 100 times in the same environment, indepen-
dently. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the hypothesis about
the differences between the success rate means (when running the experi-
ment 50, 100, 150 and 200 times) [Cohen 1995]. The procedure revealed that
for all the experiments, the differences between means were not signiﬁcant
(F3,8 D0:027, p>0:05) and so the results obtained are statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure4showstheperformanceoftheagentsandthecontrolmodelsinterms
of the success rate percentage. The success rate is the number of times, as a
percentage, the agent is successful in obtaining the item. The ﬁrst three bars
represent the control models and the remaining three bars represent the three
agents with three different bidding strategies. It can be seen that when pr is
low, the success rate is low. When pr is high, the agents have a better chance
of obtaining the desired item. At each pr point, the bidding agents performed
better than the control models. When the value of pr reaches 80 and 82, C2,
Agent I, Agent II, and Agent III achieved a 100% success rate, since the prior
probability of winning in a single auction at this pr is very close to 1. In this
particular implementation, it is observed from the closing price distribution
thatthemeanis76andthestandarddeviationis5.Thisleadstotheassumption
that if the agent’s pr is 76, the probability of it winning in a single auction is 0.5.
The comparison for the average payoffs is shown in Figure 5. The average
payoff is deﬁned as
P
1·n·100(
pr¡vi=pr
n ), where vi is the winning bid value for
auction i. The average payoff is calculated by deducting the agent’s bid value
(thevalueatwhichitacquirestheitem)fromtheagent’sprivatevaluation.This
value is then divided by the agent’s private valuation, summed and averaged
over the number of runs (in this case 100). Here, all three agents outperformed
the control models for all pr values. The payoffs obtained by the control models
are consistently lower than the bidding agents’ payoffs. It can also be seen that
as pr increases, the payoffs that the bidding agents received also increased.
This indicates that the bidding agents actively looked for a bargain when their
pr is high.
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Fig. 5. Average payoff comparisons
The results of these experiments led to several conclusions. First, an agent
that can bid effectively across multiple auctions is better than one that stays
situated in a single auction. By being able to participate in multiple auctions,
the agent is able to get a bargain (if it wishes to) by just changing the values of
the bidding constraints. Secondly, the private valuation is one of the most im-
portant factors that needs to be considered when determining the strategy that
should be employed by the agent. This is important, for example, since an agent
with a very low pr cannot look for a bargain and the agent should therefore con-
sider this when accepting the user’s preferences. The third observation is that
the remaining time and remaining auctions tactics are the key determinants
of successful behavior. Finally, the strategies to be used by the agent need to be
dynamic, since not all strategies work well in all situations. Thus, a successful
strategy in one situation may perform badly in another. However, it is possible
to determine that certain classes of strategy are effective in environments that
have particular characteristics. As an example, the agent strategy with val-
ues krt D0:60, ¯rt D100, kra D0:60, ¯raD100, kba D0:30, ¯ba D0:50, kde D0:70,
¯de D200, wrt D0:40, wra D0:20, wba D0:10 and wde D0:30 was used three times
for pr values of 70, 72 and 75 respectively. It can be seen that it achieved the
highest success rate when pr is 72 but placed second highest when the private
valuation is at 70 and 75. Its average payoff is highest at pr D72 and pr D70
but it achieved second highest when pr D75. Here, we can conclude that this
strategy performs best at pr D72, but it does not necessarily perform well with
other values of pr. However, this strategy did not perform well at pr D75 (even
though this value is higher than 72) because the allocated bidding time may be
short and the number of auctions that it can participate in may be limited. In
this case, the key deﬁning characteristics of an environment were found to be
the number of auctions that are active before tmax and the time the agent has
to purchase the item (i.e., tmax ¡ tcurrent).
Having shown the beneﬁts of having an agent that acts across multiple auc-
tions and the close link between strategy effectiveness and environment type,
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Fig. 6. Encoding of a bidding strategy.
the next step is to determine which strategies should be used in which environ-
ments. To this end, the next section discusses how we used GAs to address this
problem.
4. EVOLVING BIDDING STRATEGIES
The performance of the bidding agent is heavily inﬂuenced by the strategy em-
ployed, which, in turn, relates to the values of k and ¯ in the given tactics and
the weights for each tactic when these are combined. The number of strate-
gies that can be employed is inﬁnite, so, therefore, is the search space. Thus,
handcrafting strategies, as per the previous section, is not realistic in the long
term. Thus a means of automating the process of ﬁnding successful strategies is
necessary. For the reasons outlined previously, we decided to use GAs to search
ofﬂine for the most successful strategies in the predeﬁned environments. Based
on the results of Section 3.3, the three key determinants for the strategy selec-
tion are the remaining time left, the remaining auctions left and the private
valuation. In this work, we deﬁned four environments that take into accounts
these determinants. The ﬁrst one (STLA) is where there is a short bidding
time (10·tmax ·20) and a small number of active auctions in the marketplace
(jL(t)j·10). The second environment (STMA) is where there is a short bidding
time but the number of active auctions is large (11·jL(t)j·45). The third en-
vironment (LTLA) is where the allocated bidding time is long (21·tmax ·100)
and where the number of active auctions is small. Finally, the last environment
(LTMA) is where there is a long bidding time with many active auctions in
the marketplace. Naturally, ﬁner subdivisions are possible (see Section 5) but
the focus here is demonstrating that strategies can be successfully evolved for
broad classes of environments.
4.1 Encoding the Strategies
The individuals in the populations are the bidding agents and their genes con-
sist of the parameters of the four different tactics and the relative weight for
each tactic. Thus, the individuals are represented as an array of ﬂoating points
values of:
(1) k and ¯ for the remaining time left tactic
(2) k and ¯ for the remaining auctions left tactic
(3) k and ¯ for the desire for a bargain tactic
(4) k and ¯ for the desperateness tactic
(5) the relative weights for the four tactics.
By means of illustration, Figure 6 exempliﬁes the representation of the bid-
ding strategy for Agent I with pr D68 in Table I. Each of the entries in the
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column is treated as the gene. The ﬁrst two columns indicate the agent’s values
for k and ¯ for the remaining time left tactic, the next columns are the values
for k and ¯ for the remaining three tactics and the last four columns represent
the relative weight for each tactic.
4.2 Computing the Fitness Function
The ﬁtness function measures how well the individual performs against the
others. Designing the ﬁtness function is one of the key facets of GAs and so
here we consider three plausible alternatives. These are the individual success
rate in obtaining the item (Fitness Equation 1) and two variations based on
the average utility. In the ﬁrst case (Fitness Equation 2), the agent gets a util-
ity of 0 if it fails to obtain the item. If it is successful, the utility of winning
in an auction i is computed as Ui(v)D(
pr¡v
pr ) C c, where v is the winning bid
and c is an arbitrary constant ranging from 0.001 to 0.005 to ensure that the
agent receives some value when the winning bid is equivalent to its private
valuation. The ﬁnal utility function (Fitness Equation 3) is similar to Fitness
Equation 2 but the individual is penalised if it fails to get the item. In this
case the penalty incurred ranges from 0.01 to 0.05. These values were chosen
to analyse how the population evolves with varying degrees of penalty. Intu-
itively, Fitness Equation 1 should be used if delivery of the item is of utmost
important, Fitness Equation 2 should be used if the agent is looking for a bar-
gain and Fitness Equation 3 should be used when delivery of the item and
looking for a bargain are equally important. The ﬁtness score is then computed
by taking the average utility from a total of 2000 runs. It is necessary to run
these 2000 times to decrease the estimated standard error of the mean to a
minimal level (when the number of runs is 500, the standard error of the mean
is 5.0458, but this ﬁgure is signiﬁcantly reduced to 1.1559 when the number of
runs is increased to 2000). Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was also used to test
hypothesis about the differences between the ﬁtness score means collected for
the different number of runs. The null hypothesis of equal means was rejected
because the procedure revealed that for all the experiments, the differences
between means were signiﬁcant (F4,245 D675:182, p < 0:05) and so the results
are statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3 Searching for Successful Strategies
The algorithm for searching for acceptable strategies in a given environment is
shown in Figure 7 and is elaborated upon in the remainder of this subsection.
4.3.1 Create Initial Bidder Population. The initial bidder population rep-
resents the starting point of the search and consists of N D50 individuals
that are generated randomly from the range of speciﬁed values. These values
are based on the polynomial functions deﬁned in Section 3.1. For the remain-
ing time and the remaining auctions left tactics, the values are 0·k ·1 and
0:005·¯ ·0:5. In the desire for a bargain tactic, the values are 0:1·k ·0:3
and 0:005·¯ ·0:5. The values for k and ¯ in the desperateness tactic are
0:7·k ·0:9 and 1:67·¯ ·1000.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.202 ² P. Anthony and N. R. Jennings
Fig. 7. The strategy searching genetic algorithm.
4.3.2 The Selection Process. The purpose of the selection process is to en-
sure that the ﬁtter individuals are chosen to populate the next generation in
the hope that their offspring will in turn have higher ﬁtness [Beasley et al.
1993a]. “Elitism” is used here to force the GAs to retain some number of the
best individuals at each generation [Mitchell 1996], since such individuals can
be lost if they are not chosen to reproduce or if they are destroyed by crossover
and mutation. Ten percent of the best individuals are copied to the new pop-
ulation to ensure that a signiﬁcant proportion of the ﬁtter individuals make
it to the next generation. The remaining ninety percent of the individuals in
the population are then chosen using Tournament Selection [Blickle and Thiele
1995b]. The selection is performed by choosing some number ' from the pop-
ulation and the best individual in this group is copied into the intermediate
population (which is referred to as the mating pool). This process is repeated
for 90% of N times. This selection technique is known to work well since it
allows a diverse range of ﬁt agents to populate the mating pool [Blickle and
Thiele 1995a]. Once the mating pool is created, the individual with highest ﬁt-
ness is selected and moved to the new generation. The remaining individuals
go through the process of crossover and mutation before making it to the new
population. The new population includes a group of the ﬁttest individual and
the offspring generated from the reproduction process.
4.3.3 The Crossover Process. This process exchanges the genes between
individual agents. Two individuals are randomly selected from the mating pool
with crossover probability of pc D0:6, and the crossover point (c) is equal to 2.
Crossover probability is the rate at which the population exchanges genetic ma-
terials [Mitchell 1996]. More speciﬁcally, two individuals are picked from the
population. Two crossover points are then randomly picked. These points are
wherethetwoindividualswillexchangetheirgeneticmaterial.Theexchanging
of genetic material process is performed using an extension combination oper-
ator [Beasley et al. 1993b], which works by taking the difference between two
values of the crossover point, adding this difference to the higher (giving the
maximum range) and subtracting it from the lower (giving a minimum range).
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The new values are then generated between the minimum and maximum
range.
4.3.4 The Mutation Process. Mutation allows the population to explore the
search space but at a slower rate. In this work, individuals from the population
are selected to mutate with a probability of pm D0:02. The gene from the chosen
individual is picked randomly and a small value (0.05) is added or subtracted,
depending on the range limitation for that particular gene. The mutation pro-
cess is only applied to the values of k and ¯ for each tactic. The weights are not
considered here because adding a small value to the weight requires a renor-
malization and will have very little effect on the agent’s online behavior.
4.3.5 TheStoppingCriterion. Theprocessterminateswhenthepopulation
converges. This is a condition where the population evolves over successive
generations such that the ﬁtness of the best and the average individual in each
generation increase toward a global optimum [Beasley et al. 1993a]. The global
optimum is deﬁned as the highest peak in the search space [Mitchell 1996]. In
this case, the population always converges before 50 iterations (typically, the
value lies between 24 and 40).
4.4 Evaluating the Evolved Strategies
The aim of these experiments is to show that GAs can be used to evolve strate-
gies that are effective in particular environments. To this end, the GAs are run
in four different environments (in which the agent’s pr is set to 75). For each en-
vironment, we use the three different ﬁtness functions described in Section 4.2.
Apart from determining the strategies that work well in a given context, these
experiments also aim to evaluate the strategies in terms of their success rate
and the average payoff in a similar manner to the experimental evaluation con-
ductedinSection3.3.However,thekeydifferenceisthat,here,theperformance
of the agents is evaluated based on an environment that has a particular set
of characteristics. The performance of the evolved strategies is then compared
with that of a control model C. C’s strategy is to bid in the auction that has
the closest end time where the current bid is less than its pr. This model was
chosen because it performed well in the previous experiment as reported in
Section 3.3 (in fact, this is C2). We also ran another set of experiments in the
subenvironment of short time less auctions (STLA) in which the value of pr is
varied between a low value of 68, a medium value of 76 and a high value of 82.
The purpose of this is to determine how the strategies evolve when varying pr.
Turning to the ﬁrst set of experiments (summarized in Table II). These re-
sults show the best strategies that have evolved for the different classes of
environment. Each row contains the resulting strategies for each environment
using Fitness Equations 1, 2 and 3.13 The values for the tactics are expressed
as a pair of k and ¯ and the weights for the bidding constraints are expressed
as (wrt, wra, wba, wde). When a particular tactic is not present in the evolved
13FE1 indicates Fitness Equation 1, FE2 indicates Fitness Equation 2 and FE3 indicates Fitness
Equation 3.
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Table II. Summary of the Best Strategies with pr D75
Environment (krt, ¯rt) (kra, ¯ra) (kba, ¯ba) (kde, ¯de) (wrt, wra, wba, wde)
FE1STLA (0.73, 99.59) (0.84, 56.04) (0.76, 0.00, 0.00, 0.24)
FE1STMA (0.63, 515.67) (0.28, 0.31) (0.73, 385.75) (0.45, 0.00, 0.01, 0.54)
FE1LTLA (1.00, 0.36) (0.83, 67.38) (0.00, 0.46, 0.00, 0.54)
FE1LTMA (0.23, 683.97) (0.78, 2.70) (0.83, 0.00, 0.00, 0.17)
FE2STLA (0.89, 1.44) (0.94, 233.50) (0.15, 0.40) (0.71, 55.44) (0.35, 0.16, 0.15, 0.34)
FE2STMA (10.59, 507.92) (0.81, 6.31) (0.23, 0.06) (0.80, 68.07) (0.17, 0.03, 0.25, 0.55)
FE2LTLA (0.70, 8.28) (0.40, 5.21) (0.25, 0.32) (0.83, 648.90) (0.65, 0.21, 0.02, 0.12)
FE2LTMA (0.81, 9.74) (1.00, 0.83) (0.23, 0.04) (0.82, 575.00) (0.14, 0.49, 0.22, 0.15)
FE3STLA (0.72, 25.56) (0.87, 55.75) (0.00, 0.42, 0.00, 0.58)
FE3STMA (0.83, 52.00) (0.10, 0.29) (0.80, 0.00, 0.20, 0.00)
FE3LTLA (0.41, 720.61) (0.27, 7.95) (0.71, 9.12) (0.57, 0.19, 0.00, 0.24)
FE3LTMA (0.59, 0.33) (0.21, 654.55) (0.12, 0.03) (0.89, 19.17) (0.16, 0.05, 0.01, 0.78)
Fig. 8. Agent’s performance in terms of success rate.
strategy, the cell corresponding to it is blank. The utilization of the differ-
ent ﬁtness functions reﬂects the varying behavior that the agent can employ
in a given situation. It can be observed that the agents that utilised Fitness
Equation 1 (where delivery is of utmost important) did indeed score a higher
percentage in terms of success rate than the agents that used the other two
ﬁtness functions (see Figure 8) and the control model C, for all environments.
Agents that used Fitness Equation 2 achieved the highest utility in all the en-
vironments (see Figure 9), whereas agents that used Fitness Equation 3 strike
a balance between a high success rate and a high payoff. These results are very
much as expected (see Section 4.2).
In the STLA environment based on Fitness Equation 1, the dominant strat-
egy that emerged is the combination of the remaining time and the desper-
ateness tactics (wrt D0:76, wde D0:24). In this particular situation, the agent’s
initial bids in both tactics are high and the agent quickly reaches its pr
(krt D0:73, ¯rt D99:59, kde D0:84, ¯de D56:04).Thisbehaviorisrationalsincean
agentthatisinterestedindeliveringtheitemsuccessfullyinthiscontextshould
bid aggressively from the beginning to maximize its chances of acquiring the
item. When Fitness Equation 2 is used, the dominant strategy that emerged is
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Fig. 9. Agent’s performance in terms of average utility.
one that utilises all the tactics, but that places more importance on the remain-
ing time and desperateness tactics. This is because the agent that is looking for
a high payoff should consider the bargain tactic as one of the tactics to ensure
a higher payoff. The strategy that emerged based on Fitness Equation 3 is one
that considers the remaining auctions left and the desperateness tactics where
the agent’s initial bid is high and quickly reaches pr. This strategy is similar to
the one that emerged from Fitness Equation 1, but the rate at which it reaches
pr is slower. The reason for this is that an agent that is looking to maximize
the payoff whilst ensuring delivery of the item needs to maintain a balance
between a low bid price and the rate at which it reaches pr.
In the STMA environment, an effective strategy should consider the remain-
ing time and desperateness tactics highly since the allocated bidding time is
limited (as per STLA). This is true when delivery of the item is important (as
reﬂected in Fitness Equation 1’s result), but also when payoff (refer to result
of Fitness Equation 2) is the main consideration (here the agent combines all
the tactics but heavier weights are placed on the desperateness and bargain
tactics). This situation differs from STLA because here, the agent can afford
to spend some time looking for a bargain since the number of active auctions
is large. The dominant strategy that emerged based on Fitness Equation 3 is
surprising because it combines the remaining time and the bargain tactics,
instead of deploying a more aggressive behavior of combining the remain-
ing time, desperateness and the bargain tactics. In this case, the strategy is
aware of the large number of active auctions so it tries to get a higher pay-
off, but at the same time it takes into account the length of time it has left
to bid.
The strategy that evolved for the LTLA environment based on Fitness
Equation 1 is one that considers the remaining auctions and the desperate-
ness tactics. This is because the strategy has to deliver the item successfully
in an environment where there is a limited number of active auctions that
the agent can participate in. As expected, when payoff is the main considera-
tion, the strategy that evolved considers all tactics. The strategy that emerged
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Table III. Strategies for STLA with Varying Private Valuations
pr (krt, ¯rt) (kra, ¯ra) (kba, ¯ba) (kde, ¯de) (wrt, wra, wba, wde)
68 (0.64, 5.44) (0.57, 79.37) (0.11, 0.15) (0.75, 466.24) (0.12, 0.00, 0.00, 0.88)
76 (0.05, 0.99) (0.58, 508.59) (0.23, 0.08) (0.90, 86.53) (0.00, 0.17, 0.00, 0.83)
82 (0.07, 97.11) (0.06, 12.37) (0.17, 0.46) (0.75, 4.74) (0.36, 0.35, 0.18, 0.11)
Fig. 10. Agent’s performance with varying private valuations.
based on Fitness Equation 3 considers the remaining time, remaining auctions
and desperateness tactics. Bargain is not considered here, since the number of
active auctions in the marketplace is small (as per STLA).
All the strategies that evolved in the LTMA environment, for all ﬁtness func-
tions, achieved more than 90% success rate, but they differ in terms of payoff.
The reason for this high success is due to the long bidding time, as well as the
large number of active auctions that agents can participate in. Hence, the agent
has many chances of winning. In this particular situation, the main considera-
tion is the payoff. As can be seen, the strategies that utilised Fitness Equation 2
and3generatehigherpayoffswhencomparedtothestrategythatevolvedbased
on Fitness Equation 1 and the control model C. The reason for this is that both
C and Fitness Equation 1 consider delivery as the most important criteria and
payoff is not taken into account.
Turning now to the second class of experiments. Table III shows the strate-
giesthatevolvedintheSTLAenvironmentbasedonFitnessEquation3.Fitness
Equation 3 is used here since it offers a reasonably high success and payoff. In
thiscontext,Figure10showsthatthesuccessrateandthepayoffincreasewhen
pr increases. The high payoff that the agent receives when using the strategy
evolved with pr indicates that the agent actively tries to look for bargain when
privatevaluationishigh(pr D82).Incontrast,whentheprivatevaluationislow
(pr D68), the agent evolves a strategy that combines the remaining time and
the desperateness tactics to take advantage of the limited time, limited num-
ber of active auctions and limited pr. The strategy that emerged with pr D76 is
similar to the one that evolved with pr D68, but this time, it considers the re-
maining auctions left instead of the remaining time left. With a higher private
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valuation, the agent has a better chance of obtaining the item, enabling it to
switch to a strategy that focuses on the desperateness tactic and the remaining
auctions left tactic. When pr is high, the strategy that emerged considers all
tactics as expected. These results led us to conclude that evolving the strategies
for ﬁner subdivisions (e.g., by further partitioning the STLA environment into
more private valuation divisions) will better tune the agent’s bidding strategy
and result in a more superior performance.
In summary, several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, GAs
can be used to evolve strategies that are successful in particular environments
(in all cases, performance is superior to the control model). Second, when se-
lecting a strategy to bid in the multiple auctions environment, the agent needs
to determine the current environment’s type, as well as the user’s preferences.
Depending on these two, it can then decide which strategy to deploy. The re-
sult presented in Figure 10 shows that as the private valuation increases, the
success rate increases, therefore allowing the strategy to deploy a bargaining
behavior to generate a higher payoff. Finally, the results also indicate that the
categories of environment for which the strategies need to be evolved can be
further subdivided into ﬁner divisions so that the agent can better tune its
bidding strategy to its prevailing circumstances.
5. THE INTELLIGENT BIDDING STRATEGY
Having shown that GAs can effectively evolve strategies for different environ-
ments, the ﬁnal step is to combine this knowledge into a single intelligent bid-
ding agent. This agent has at its disposal knowledge about which strategies are
effective in which environments and, assuming it can assess the environment
accurately, it simply has to deploy the appropriate strategy.
In more detail, we subdivided our environments into 54 categories (shown
in Table IV) based on the key determinants identiﬁed in Section 4.4; namely
the private valuation, the remaining time left, the remaining auctions left and
the agent’s behavior (whether looking for a bargain, desperate, or a mixture
of both). The private valuation can be broadly categorised by its value: low
(RP1), medium (RP2) or high (RP3). In this particular implementation, low is
between 60 and 72, medium is between 73 and 79 and high is between 80 and
82. These three categories are then reﬁned further into three subcategories
based on the agent’s behavior (FE 1 is desperate, FE 2 is looking for a bargain
and FE 3 aims for a balance of both). Finally, each subcategorization is further
divided into 54 grouping that consist of the short time less auctions environ-
ment (STLA), short time many auctions environment (STMA), medium time
less auctions environment (MTLA), medium time many auctions environment
(MTMA), long time less auctions environment (LTLA) and long time many auc-
tions environment (LTMA). In this case, less auctions and many auctions are
as deﬁned in Section 4. Short time is deﬁned as 10·tmax ·20, medium time
is deﬁned as 21·tmax ·50 and long time is deﬁned as 51·tmax ·100. As an
example, RP1FE2STMA represents an environment with a low private valua-
tion, where the bidding time is short, but where there are many auctions and
the customer is interested in a bargain.
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Table IV. The Environments
STLA STLA STLA
STMA STMA STMA
FE1 MTLA FE1 MTLA FE1 MTLA
MTMA MTMA MTMA
LTLA LTLA LTLA
LTMA LTMA LTMA
STLA STLA STLA
STMA STMA STMA
RP1 FE2 MTLA RP2 FE2 MTLA RP3 FE2 MTLA
MTMA MTMA MTMA
LTLA LTLA LTLA
LTMA LTMA LTMA
STLA STLA STLA
STMA STMA STMA
FE3 MTLA FE3 MTLA FE3 MTLA
MTMA MTMA MTMA
LTLA LTLA LTLA
LTMA LTMA LTMA
RP1: Low Private Valuation STLA: Short Time Less Auctions
RP2: Medium Private Valuation STMA: Short Time Many Auctions
RP3: High Private Valuation MTLA: Medium Time Less Auctions
FE1: Fitness Equation I MTMA: Medium Time Many Auctions
FE2: Fitness Equation II LTLA: Long Time Less Auctions
FE3: Fitness Equation III LTMA: Long Time Many Auctions
The categorization of the private valuation is made based on the auction
closing price distribution (as per Section 3.3, the closing price mean is 76 and
the standard deviation is 5). Fifty percent of the auctions should be won by
bidders with medium private valuations, 25% by bidders with low private val-
uations and the remaining 25% by the bidders with high private valuation. In
real market settings, the price of each desired item will naturally vary depend-
ing on the type of the item itself (e.g., a diamond ring usually costs more than a
book). However, the value of a given item can be directly mapped to the reser-
vation price categorisation merely by obtaining the mean price of the item. This
can be achieved using comparison price data from sites such as PriceSCAN,14
DealTime,15 and BottomDollar.16 From this, the agent can calculate the mean
price of a given item and regenerate price ranges for the low, medium and high
private valuations. The subdivisions of the short time, medium time, long time,
less auctions and many auctions can also be carried out in a similar manner.
We then used the search algorithm deﬁned in Section 4.3 to evolve the best
strategyforeachenvironment.Thus,theagentgetstheuser’sprivatevaluation,
the item to be purchased, when it is required and the intention of the user
(either looking for a bargain, desperate or some combination of the two). With
this knowledge, the agent enters the marketplace and determines the number
of active auctions in which it can participate within the given time constraint.
Based on this combination of information, the agent determines which strategy
14http://www.pricescan.com/.
15http://www1.dealtime.com/.
16http://www.bottomdollar.com/.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.Developing a Bidding Agent for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions ² 209
to use in each auction round. This decision is captured in a rule base that maps
the prevailing context to the strategy that has been evolved for that situation
(see Table V). Upon selection of the appropriate strategy the agent proceeds as
deﬁned in Figure 2.
5.1 Experimental Evaluation
The hypothesis that we seek to evaluate in this section is that our intelligent
bidding strategy performs effectively in a wide range of bidding contexts. Here,
the performance of the agent is measured in terms of success rate and aver-
age utility (as deﬁned in Section 4.4). As our control models, we use an agent
(C1) that has a single ﬁxed strategy based on the user’s behavior and an agent
(C2) that possesses a random behavior. In particular, we picked the strategy
that was evolved for the environments RP2FE1MTMA, RP2FE2MTMA and
RP2FE3MTMA (as discussed in Section 4.4)17 for C1. Thus, C1 has three dif-
ferent strategies; when a user is interested in a bargain, C1 selects the strategy
that was evolved for RP2FE2MTMA, when a user is desperate for the item, C1
employs the strategy that was evolved for RP2FE1MTMA and when a user
is looking for a combination of both, it utilises the strategy evolved based on
RP2FE3MTMA. In particular, Table VI shows the values of the respective k, ¯,
and the weights for each bidding constraint employed by C1. Control C2, on the
other hand, is an agent that utilises a strategy in line with the user’s preference
that is randomly picked (for each run) from those listed in Table V. Thus, if a
user is interested in a bargain, the agent randomly selects any of the 18 strate-
gies in FE2. When a user is desperate for the item, the agent selects randomly
from the strategies in FE1. Finally, when a user is looking for a combination
of both, the agent selects the strategies in FE3 randomly. It was decided to use
three strategies for the control models, rather than a single strategy, so that we
could measure the performance of the agents in terms of the individual user’s
preferences. At any point in time, our intelligent agent will always possess one
behavior (looking for a bargain, desperate or some combination of these two).
Obviously, if its behavior is one that is interested in a bargain, the average
utility should be high, but the success rate may be low. The converse of this
is when our intelligent agent possesses desperate behavior; the success rate
should go up, but the average utility may go down. Thus, to compare like with
like, we consider the control model as similarly having the strategy that seeks
to maximize the desired user behavior.
The experimental set up is broadly as described in Section 3.3. In particu-
lar, the agent and the control model were run 1000 times in the marketplace.
ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis about the differences of the success
rate means (when running the experiment 200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000 times)
and the procedure revealed that for all experiments, the differences between
means were not signiﬁcant (F4,15) D0:134, p>0:05. Thus, the results obtained
are statistically signiﬁcant. The user’s requirement was randomly allocated;
17We chose these environments because the average time to procure the good in the marketplace is
50, the average total number of auctions (jL(t)j) is 30 and the average closing price is 76 and these
values fall into the RP2MTMA category.
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Table V. Strategies for the Intelligent Agent
Behavior (krt,¯rt) (kra, ¯ra) (kba, ¯ba) (kde, ¯de) (wrt, wra, wba, wde)
RP1FE1STLA (0.88, 9.61) (0.46, 60.63) (0.14, 0.31) (0.83, 315.43) (0.03, 0.66, 0.00, 0.31)
RP1FE2STLA (0.14, 21.82) (0.02, 0.26) (0.18, 0.17) (0.75, 955.67) (0.52, 0.00, 0.00, 0.48)
RP1FE3STLA (0.24, 699.85) (0.71, 6.86) (0.22, 0.40) (0.81, 7.72) (0.04 0.05, 0.00, 0.91)
RP1FE1STMA (0.91, 290.24) (0.93, 5.00) (0.16, 0.46) (0.83, 5.15) (0.79, 0.00, 0.00, 0.21)
RP1FE2STMA (0.64, 234.36) (0.88, 0.99) (0.22, 0.10) (0.76, 6.06) (0.54, 0.03, 0.03, 0.40)
RP1FE3STMA (0.39, 97.17) (0.82, 63.22) (0.24, 0.34) (0.76, 2.42) (0.18, 0.51, 0.00, 0.31)
RP1FE1MTLA (0.22, 64.16) (0.29, 255.81) (0.10, 0.21) (0.78, 25.23) (0.00, 0.77, 0.00, 0.23)
RP1FE2MTLA (0.84, 975.47) (0.92, 964.05) (0.25, 0.45) (0.84, 6.05) (0.00, 0.06, 0.00, 0.94)
RP1FE3MTLA (0.13, 527.00) (0.92, 0.47) (0.26, 0.31) (0.78, 53.62) (0.80, 0.18, 0.01, 0.01)
RP1FE1MTMA (0.52, 325.34) (0.52, 5.18) (0.26, 0.24) (0.83, 33.84) (0.83, 0.00, 0.00, 0.17)
RP1FE2MTMA (0.80, 9.06) (0.25, 0.89) (0.18, 0.23) (0.88, 193.35) (0.63, 0.00, 0.03, 0.34)
RP1FE3MTMA (0.71, 300.22) (0.83, 0.87) (0.26, 0.15) (0.86, 5.64) (0.00, 0.01, 0.00, 0.99)
RP1FE1LTLA (0.11, 61.68) (0.67, 2.53) (0.14, 0.42) (0.72, 475.00) (0.23, 0.00, 0.00, 0.77)
RP1FE2LTLA (0.12, 604.92) (0.77, 0.61) (0.24, 0.11) (0.85, 38.93) (0.87, 0.13, 0.00, 0.00)
RP1FE3LTLA (0.48, 945.65) (0.75, 1.50) (0.19, 0.38) (0.85, 35.03) (0.14, 0.14, 0.00, 0.72)
RP1FE1LTMA (0.45, 31.57) (0.97, 870.65) (0.20, 0.37) (0.73, 25.35) (0.00, 0.44, 0.00, 0.56)
RP1FE2LTMA (0.86, 0.19) (0.26, 443.92) (0.30, 0.47) (0.79, 6.02) (0.00, 0.06, 0.00, 0.94)
RP1FE3LTMA (0.68, 2.64) (0.43, 0.76) (0.28, 0.38) (0.87, 581.70) (0.28, 0.00, 0.00, 0.72)
RP2FE1STLA (0.63, 828.18) (0.06, 586.30) (0.17, 0.49) (0.87, 83.56) (0.69, 0.00, 0.00, 0.31)
RP2FE2STLA (0.76, 0.60) (0.38, 2.68) (0.28, 0.13) (0.73, 5.83) (0.00, 0.00, 0.03, 0.97)
RP2FE3STLA (0.94, 852.13) (0.99, 9.99) (0.24, 0.14) (0.77, 24.34) (0.00, 0.22, 0.05, 0.73)
RP2FE1STMA (0.99, 0.83) (0.92, 64.17) (0.21, 0.24) (0.84, 7.79) (0.23, 0.77, 0.00, 0.00)
RP2FE2STMA (0.16, 154.88) (0.87, 0.92) (0.17, 0.33) (0.82. 8.56) (0.63, 0.08, 0.09, 0.20)
RP2FE3STMA (0.06, 1.85) (0.93, 77.07) (0.13, 0.11) (0.76, 725.77) (0.18, 0.39, 0.00, 0.43)
RP2FE1MTLA (0.88, 535.04) (0.27, 7.51) (0.28, 0.22) (0.75, 94.99) (0.27, 0.00, 0.00, 0.73)
RP2FE2MTLA (0.00, 9.38) (0.94, 2.61) (0.23, 0.35) (0.85, 56.62) (0.28, 0.72, 0.00, 0.00)
RP2FE3MTLA (0.73, 8.33) (0.74, 6.95) (0.24, 0.38) (0.82, 6.59) (0.40, 0.19, 0.00, 0.41)
RP2FE1MTMA (0.89, 32.56) (1.00, 0.09) (0.14, 0.21) (0.82. 357) (0.95, 0.05, 0.00, 0.00)
RP2FE2MTMA (0.83, 2.41) (0.83, 78.85) (0.17, 0.12) (0.76, 648.30) (0.21, 0.60, 0.07, 0.12)
RP2FE3MTMA (0.92, 963.71) (0.16, 0.48) (0.15, 0.13) (0.84, 57.56) (0.00, 0.08, 0.00, 0.92)
RP2FE1LTLA (0.53, 94.45) (0.46, 16.32) (0.22, 0.38) (0.79, 168.42) (0.44, 0.00, 0.00, 0.56)
RP2FE2LTLA (0.81, 81.56) (0.5, 8.85) (0.15, 0.37) (0.84, 6.87) (0.22, 0.00, 0.05, 0.73)
RP2FE3LTLA (0.28, 0.53) (0.62, 971.46) (0.17, 0.41) (0.89, 266.92) (0.04, 0.02, 0.02, 0.92)
RP2FE1LTMA (0.21, 596.56) (0.67, 21.62) (0.28, 0.16) (0.73, 96.00) (0.13, 0.05, 0.00, 0.82)
RP2FE2LTMA (0.64, 328.86) (0.54, 0.44) (0.25, 0.14) (0.78, 4.65) (0.87, 0.11, 0.01, 0.01)
RP2FE3LTMA (0.76, 4.41) (0.71, 41.41) (0.17, 0.34) (0.89, 93.09) (0.09, 0.65, 0.09, 0.17)
RP3FE1STLA (0.17, 64.30) (0.10, 9.12) (0.23, 0.17) (0.84, 83.46) (0.72, 0.01, 0.00, 0.27)
RP3FE2STLA (0.49, 4.68) (0.89, 0.66) (0.18, 0.42) (0.80, 5.89) (0.46, 0.45, 0.00, 0.09)
RP3FE3STLA (0.43, 73.87) (0.84, 61.46) (0.11, 0.11) (0.80, 5.43) (0.06, 0.15, 0.06, 0.73)
RP3FE1STMA (0.73, 8.23) (0.90, 79.72) (0.21, 0.38) (0.78, 36.97) (0.38, 0.00, 0.00, 0.62)
RP3FE2STMA (0.19, 0.35) (0.73, 160.09) (0.11, 0.28) (0.79, 5.17) (0.13, 0.08, 0.00, 0.79)
RP3FE3STMA (0.86, 1.38) (0.81, 4.49) (0.12, 0.27) (0.86, 3.16) (0.15, 0.49, 0.00, 0.36)
RP3FE1MTLA (0.83, 97.05) (0.89, 71.76) (0.16, 0.37) (0.84, 349.48) (0.74, 0.00, 0.00, 0.26)
RP3FE2MTLA (0.62, 65.60) (0.91, 33.69) (0.19, 0.31) (0.81, 671.41) (0.77, 0.06, 0.09, 0.08)
RP3FE3MTLA (0.18, 34.38) (0.60, 803.84) (0.22, 0.39) (0.88, 4.60) (0.39, 0.00, 0.08, 0.53)
RP3FE1MTMA (0.10, 98.30) (0.96, 68.06) (0.20, 0.36) (0.78, 97.29) (0.94, 0.06, 0.00, 0.00)
RP3FE2MTMA (0.47, 8.08) (0.80, 0.53) (0.29, 0.41) (0.79, 3.63) (0.28, 0.45, 0.01, 0.26)
RP3FE3MTMA (0.37, 8.45) (0.74, 999.85) (0.27, 0.20) (0.72, 3.22) (0.71, 0.02, 0.00, 0.27)
RP3FE1LTLA (0.28, 931.97) (0.30, 7.16) (0.22, 0.21) (0.85, 35.95) (0.46, 0.00, 0.00, 0.54)
RP3FE2LTLA (0.66, 0.01) (0.86, 0.81) (0.13, 0.43) (0.74, 624.95) (0.09, 0.39, 0.00, 0.52)
RP3FE3LTLA (0.04, 80.77) (0.29, 1.71) (0.18, 0.49) (0.87, 927.76) (0.96, 0.00, 0.00, 0.04)
RP3FE1LTMA (0.21, 89.29) (0.33, 69.06) (0.17, 0.29) (0.71, 55.04) (0.16, 0.00, 0.00, 0.84)
RP3FE2LTMA (0.30, 83.89) (0.41, 13.55) (0.30, 0.3) (0.78, 33.51) (0.46, 0.42, 0.12, 0.00)
RP3FE3LTMA (0.31, 0.73) (0.85, 2.97) (0.14, 0.20) (0.73, 2.89) (0.03, 0.83, 0.00, 0.14)
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Table VI. Strategies for the Control Model C1
Behavior (krt, ¯rt) (kra, ¯ra) (kba, ¯ba) (kde, ¯de) (wrt, wra, wba, wde)
RP2FE1MTMA (0.89, 32.56) (1.00, 0.09) (0.14, 0.21) (0.82, 3.57) (0.95, 0.05, 0.00, 0.00)
RP2FE2MTMA (0.83, 2.41) (0.83, 78.85) (0.17, 0.12) (0.76, 648.30) (0.21, 0.60, 0.07, 0.12)
RP2FE3MTMA (0.92, 963.71) (0.16, 0.48) (0.15, 0.13) (0.84, 57.56) (0.00, 0.08, 0.00, 0.92)
Fig. 11. Success rate comparisons.
the private valuation ranges from 70 to 82 and the time allocated ranges from
10 to 100.18 The user’s intention is also generated randomly. The number of
auctions running in the marketplace is between 2 and 60 and, as before, there
are between 2 and 10 participants in each such auction.
The performance of the intelligent agent and the control model in terms of
success rate is shown in Figure 11. The experiment is divided into four groups.
The ﬁrst three groups show the detailed performance of the agent and the
control models based on a single behavior (desperateness, bargain, and both)
and the last group shows the overall performance when all three behaviors
are considered. It can be seen that our intelligent agent achieved a higher
success rate for all the individual user behaviors and for the overall behavior.
In desperateness mode, the intelligent agent achieved a 7% higher success rate
than C1 and a 14% higher success rate than C2. This shows that by having the
ability to change the strategy in accordance with the user’s preference and the
environment it is situated in, our agent can maximize its chances of succeeding.
This is different from C1, in which a ﬁxed strategy is used and where the agent
views the environment and user’s preferences as static. In this case, C1w a s
only successful in the environment for which it was evolved (RP2FE1MTMA).
C2 achieves a lower success rate when compared to our intelligent agent and
C1. Since the strategy selection in C2 is random, the strategy selected may
not be suitable for the environment that the agent ﬁnds itself in. The situation
18This is slightly different from the two previous experiments in that the private valuation and the
time are now generated randomly (instead of ﬁxing them to a particular value).
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Fig. 12. Average utility comparisons.
is similar when our intelligent agent is in bargain mode. It achieved a higher
success rate when compared to the two control models. When both bargain
and desperation are considered, our intelligent agent also achieved a higher
success rate than the control models. In both cases, C1’s performance is lower
because its ﬁxed strategy is inappropriate. C1 starts bidding at a low value and
slowly reaches its private valuation. Such a strategy is simply not effective in
environments where there is a short bidding time, low private valuations or
few active auctions in the marketplace. C2 picks its strategy without taking
into account the nature of its environment, resulting in a lower performance
when compared to both C1 and our intelligent agent. When all these behaviors
are combined, our intelligent agent achieved 12% higher success rate than the
control models.
Figure 12 shows the average utility obtained by the intelligent bidding agent
andthecontrolmodels.Itcanbeseenthatouragentperformedwellcomparedto
the control model and it achieved a high average utility in all cases. However,
in the desperateness mode, our agent’s average utility surpassed the control
models’averageutilitybyonlyasmallvalue(0.00077morethanC1and0.00175
more than C2). The reason for this can be attributed to the strategies used in
C1 and C2. The former uses a ﬁxed strategy that enables it to perform well in
the RP2FE1MTMA environment and possibly the RP3 environments. This is
because with a higher private valuation, C1 has more chances of obtaining the
item irrespective of its strategy. In this case, when it wins the auction, it will
deﬁnitely obtain a high payoff resulting in a high average utility. In the latter
case, when the private valuation falls into the RP3 category, the strategy picked
yields a higher payoff than the others and this also results in a higher average
utility. This is not the case for our intelligent agent because it uses a strategy
that is evolved based on the current environment where it is not interested in
obtaining a higher utility (rather it is interested in the delivery of the required
item).
Insummary,theseresultsconﬁrmourmotivation’shypothesisthatourintel-
ligent bidding strategy can perform effectively in a wide range of environments.
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It achieved a signiﬁcantly higher success rate and a higher average utility in
all the cases considered.
6. RELATED WORK
There have been several attempts to design sophisticated and efﬁcient bidding
strategiesforagentsparticipatinginonlineauctions.Forexample,Faratinetal.
[1998] is broadly similar to the mechanism deﬁned in this article. However,
there are several important differences between one-to-one negotiations and
multiple auctions. Chief amongst these, are the type of the tactics that are
considered relevant and the aspects of the domain that need to be reﬂected
in these tactics. An extension to Faratin’s model is given by Matos, Sierra,
and Jennings [2001] who analyzed the evolution of the negotiation strategies
using GAs, and determined which of them are appropriate in which situations.
The aim of this work was to perform an evaluation of the range of negotiation
strategies by analyzing their relative success, and how these strategies evolve
over time to become a ﬁtter population. This approach is somewhat similar to
our work, but the main difference is in the domain that we are dealing with
(multiple auctions versus bilateral negotiations).
BiddingBot is a multi-agent system that supports users in attending, mon-
itoring and bidding in multiple auctions through a process called co-operative
bidding [Ito et al. 2000]. This approach demonstrates how agents can cooperate
and work together to do the bidding process in multiple auctions. It consists
of one leader and several bidder agents, where the leader agent acts as the
coordinator and the facilitator of the whole bidding process. Bidding is done by
exchanging messages between the user, the leader agent and the bidder agents.
However, the main problem with this approach is that the agents do not actu-
ally make the bidding decision. This decision is left to the user. Thus, the agents
do not have full autonomy and the decision-making process is slow since the
agent needs to interact with the user from time to time.
The trading agent competition (TAC)19 provided a platform for agent de-
signers to develop autonomous agents that can compete with one another in
multiple simultaneous auctions for complimentary and substitutable goods.
The key feature of TAC is that it required autonomous bidding agents to buy
and sell multiple interrelated goods in auctions of different types [Greenwald
and Stone 2001]. Each participating agent is a simulated travel agent with
the goal of assembling a number of travel packages for its eight clients. Each
client is characterised by a random set of preferences for the possible arrival
and departure dates, hotel rooms and entertainment tickets. The objective of
a TAC agent is to maximise the total satisfaction of its customers (i.e., the
sum of the customer’s utilities). The competition attracted a number of alter-
native agent designs (e.g., ATTac-2000 [Stone et al. 2001], RoxyBot [Boyan and
Greenwald 2001], Aster [Greenwald and Stone 2001] and SouthamptonTAC
[He and Jennings 2003]). Although there are clearly some similarities with our
scenario,therearealsoanumberofimportantdifferences.Inparticular,wecon-
centrate on the bidding strategies to obtain a single item rather than worrying
19http://www.sics.se/tac/.
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about the complementary goods that need to be bundled with the desired item.
Moreover, in TAC, the type of auctions that are conducted are continuous one-
sided auctions, standard English ascending multi-unit auctions and continuous
double auctions as opposed to our environment that runs simultaneous stan-
dard English auctions, Dutch auctions and Vickrey auctions.
Preist et al. [2001] proposed an algorithm design for agents that participate
in multiple simultaneous English auctions. The algorithm proposes a coordi-
nation mechanism to be used in an environment where all the auctions termi-
nate simulataneously, and a learning method to tackle auctions that terminate
at different times. Byde [2001] also considers this environment, but utilizes
stochastic dynamic programming to derive formal methods for optimal algo-
rithm speciﬁcation that can be used by an agent when participating in simulta-
neous auctions for a single private-value good. Both of these works are designed
speciﬁcally for purchasing items in the multiple English auctions and their al-
gorithms are not applicable in a heterogeneous protocol context. Byde et al.
[2001] presented another decision theoretic framework that an autonomous
agent can use to bid effectively across multiple auctions with various protocols
(namely, English, Dutch, ﬁrst price sealed bid and Vickrey auctions). In order
to come up with the best bid value that guarantees the delivery of the item, an
agent must always speculate about future events. To do this, Byde presented
an approximation function that provides an estimate of the expected utility
of participating in the set of future auctions. The decision making algorithm
works in this way; it selects all the Dutch, English, and sealed bid auctions
that the agent wishes to consider. It then tests the union of all three sets of
bids to determine the utility of this course of action (using the approximation
function). This process is repeated for all the possible combinations of Dutch,
English and sealed bid auctions and returns the auction set with the highest
expected utility. This auction set contains the list of all the auctions that the
agent should bid in at that particular point in time. This approach can be em-
ployed to purchase single or multiple items in online auctions. However, at this
time, the evaluation of the algorithm’s operational effectiveness has not been
reported and so we cannot determine whether it will outperform our heuristic
methods.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article presented a novel bidding algorithm that can be used for an agent
to participate in multiple online auctions, with multiple protocols, and varying
start and end times. The bidding algorithm itself is based on multiple tactics,
thateachdealwithasinglefacetoftheagent’sreasoning.Thesetacticsarecom-
bined in order to give the agent’s overall view, at a given moment in time, based
on a systematic empirical evaluation. In the evaluation, it was discovered that
the performance of the agent’s bidding strategy is mainly dependent on its pri-
vate valuation, the number of auctions left and the remaining time left. Hence,
the bidding context can be categorized according to the user’s preferences and
the environment. Given this ﬁnding, we used genetic algorithms to evolve
effective bidding strategies for particular types of preference in particular,
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classes of environment. These evolved strategies were then embedded into the
agent’s reasoning strategy so that it can perform successfully across a wide
range of auctions and can better tune its bidding behavior to its prevailing
circumstances.
The model and method that we have used in this work can be readily ex-
tended or applied to different auction settings. For instance, if there are other
bidding constraints that should affect the behavior of the agent, then these can
easily be incorporated as a new family of tactics. Similarly, we can reclassify
the environment to reﬂect any changes in the marketplace setting. As an ex-
ample, in this work, the private valuation is broadly categorized by its value
(low, medium or high). This can easily be generalized to cater for different type
of items with varying prices, simply by mapping the mean price of a given item
with the observed closing price distribution and regenerating the price ranges
for the low, medium and high private valuations. This generalization can also
be applied when subdividing the environment based on the number of auctions
in the marketplace and the remaining time left. If there is a drastic change in
the environment, these classiﬁcations can be expanded or shrunk to suit the
current situation.
In terms of the practical application of our method, one of the key problems
that needs to be addressed is how well an agent can assess the type of environ-
ment it is situated in. In the experiments reported in this article, we assume
that the agent is able to quickly and accurately determine its environment type.
However,webelievethiswillbesigniﬁcantlymoredifﬁcultinrealworldscenar-
ios. This, in turn, may require the agent to select a strategy probabilististically
according to its beliefs at a given moment in time and then to alter this strategy
as its beliefs change. This is an area that requires further investigation.
A second aspect that requires further consideration is the selection of the
targetbidfromthelistofpotentialauctions(Section3.2).Asitcurrentlystands,
the auction with the highest expected utility is selected as the agent’s target
auction. However, the expected utility is simply the product of the probability
of the agent winning in that auction at a given bid value and the value of the
agent’s utility function. This probability is calculated based on the closing price
distribution for all the auctions observed over a given time. In this setting,
this information is essentially static. Moreover, we are dealing with a group of
bidders that have broadly similar characteristics (they use dominant strategies
to their respective one-shot auctions and their private valuations are drawn
from the same probability distribution). In real market settings, the behaviors
of the bidders are likely to be more complex (e.g., they may employ variable
bidding strategies and their private valuations may be based on their own
private assessment of the item or the private valuations of their competitors).
In such cases, more accurate probability prediction is necessary to ensure that
the right target auction is picked. This should also include updating the bid
histories from time to time (the agent should also consider auctions that are
closing while it is still active in the marketplace), as well as taking into account
thebehaviorsoftheotherauctionparticipants(orwhattheagentbelievesabout
its competitors’ behaviors). Some work has been undertaken in this area (such
as belief-based learning [Preist et al. 2001] and probability estimation method
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[Dumas et al. 2002]), but the probability estimations are calculated based on
English and sealed bid auctions only.
There are also several other areas that also require further investigation.
First, given the success of our bidding strategy, we believe that it may be widely
adopted. Thus, we need to determine what happens to individual and system
performance when there are multiple agents using our strategy in a given auc-
tion context. Second, this algorithm is designed to purchase a single item from
the marketplace. We would like to determine whether the algorithm can be
extended to deal with the more general case where the agent needs to pur-
chase multiple items of a given type. Finally, we would like to compare our
heuristic method with the more principled decision theoretic approach of Byde
et al. [2002] to determine the relative strength and weaknesses of the two
methods.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Chris Preist for his comments and suggestions and Viet Dung
Dang for his help in formalizing some of the decision making procedures in the
early stage of this work.
REFERENCES
ANTHONY, P., DANG,V .D . ,H ALL,W . ,AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2001. Autonomous agents for participating
in multiple online auctions. In Proceedings of the IJCAI Workshop on E-Business and Intelligent
Web. 54–64.
ANTHONY,P .AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2002. Evolving bidding strategies for multiple auctions. In Pro-
ceedings of the 15th European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 178–182.
BAPNA, R., GOES,P . ,AND GUPTA, A. 2001. Insights and analyses of online auctions. Commun.
ACM 44, 11 (Nov.), 43–50.
BEASLEY, D., BULL,D .R . ,AND MARTIN, R. R. 1993a. An overview of genetic algorithms: Part I,
Fundamentals. Tech. Rep. 15(2), University of Purdue.
BEASLEY, D., BULL, D. R., AND MARTIN, R. R. 1993b. An overview of genetic algorithms: Part II,
Research topics. Tech. Rep. 15(4), University of Purdue.
BLICKLE,T .AND THIELE, L. 1995a. A comparison of selection schemes used in genetic algorithms.
Tech. Rep. 11, TIK.
BLICKLE,T .AND THIELE, L. 1995b. A mathematical analysis of tournament selection. In Proceed-
ings of the 6th International Conference on Genetic Algorithm (ICGA95). Morgan-Kaufmann, San
Francisco, Calif., 9–16.
BOYAN,J .AND GREENWALD, A. 2001. Bid determination in simultaneous actions: An agent archi-
tecture. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York,
210–212.
BYDE, A. 2001. Programming model for algorithm design in simultaneous auctions. In Proceed-
ings of the 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 152–163.
BYDE, A., PREIST,C . ,AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2002. Decision procedures for multiple auctions. In Pro-
ceedingsofthe1stInternationalJointConferenceonAutonomousAgentsandMultiAgentSystems:
Part 2. ACM, New York, 613–620.
COHEN, P. R. 1995. Empirical Methods for Artiﬁcial Intelligence. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.
DUMAS,M.,GOVERNATORI,G.,HOFSTEDE,A.T .,ANDRUSSELL,N. 2002. Anarchitectureforassembling
agents that participate in alternative heterogeneous auctions. In Proceedings of the Workshop on
Research Issues in Data Engineering. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, Calif., 75–83.
FARATIN, P., SIERRA,C . ,AND JENNINGS, N. R. 1998. Negotiation decision functions for autonomous
agents. Int. J. Robot. Autonom. Syst. 24, 3-4, 159–182.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.Developing a Bidding Agent for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions ² 217
GREENWALD,A .AND STONE, P. 2001. Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent competition.
IEEE Internet Comput. 52–60.
HE,M .AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2003. SouthamptonTAC: An adaptive autonomous trading agent.
ACM Trans. Internet Tech. 3, 3 (Aug.), 000–000.
HE, M., JENNINGS, N. R., AND LEUNG, H. F. 2003. On agent-mediated electronic commerce. IEEE
Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 15, 4 (July/Aug.).
ITO, T., FUKUTA, N., SHINTANI,T . ,AND SYCARA, K. 2000. Biddingbot: A multiagent support system
for cooperative bidding in multiple auctions. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on MultiAgent Systems (Boston, Mass.). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, Calif.,
399–400.
KLEMPERER, P. 1999. Auction theory: A guide to literature. J. Econ. Surv. 13, 3, 227–286.
MATOS,N.,SIERRA,C .,ANDJENNINGS,N.R. 2001. Successfulnegotiationstrategies:Anevolutionary
approach. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems (Paris,
France). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, Calif., 182–189.
MCAFEE,R .P .AND MCMILLAN, J. 1987. Auctions and bidding. J. Econ. Lit. 25, 639–738.
MCAFEE,R .P .AND MCMILLAN, J. 1992. Bidding rings. Amer. Econ. Rev. 82, 3 (June), 579–599.
MITCHELL, M. 1996. An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
PREIST, C., BARTOLINI,C . ,AND PHILLIPS, I. 2001. Algorithm design for agents which participate in
multiple simultaneous auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce III. Lecture Notes in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence. Springer, Berlin, Germany, 139–154.
SANDHOLM, T. W. 1999. Distributed rational decision making. In Multiagent Systems: A Modern
Approach to Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence, G. Weiss, Ed. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
USA, 201–258.
STONE, P., LITTMAN, M. L., SINGH,S . ,AND KEARNS, M. 2001. Attac-2000: An adaptive autonomous
bidding agent. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents. ACM,
New York, 238–248.
VICKREY, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J. Fin. 16, 8–37.
Received October 2002; revised February 2003; accepted February 2003
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.